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Abstract
There is a shortage of empirical studies on the
relationship between Chinese hydropower
dams and social sustainability. Comparative
research on Chinese-funded and Chinese-built
hydropower projects is rare. This article aims
to fill parts of this gap by discussing these
issues in relation to Chinese overseas hydro-
power dams in Ghana (Bui Dam) and Cambo-
dia (Kamchay Dam). Both projects are built by
Sinohydro and financed by ExIm Bank. This
article draws on in-depths interviews and
focus group discussions with local communi-
ties affected by the dams, institutional actors
in Ghana and Cambodia, Chinese actors, and
dam builders. The article uses an environ-
mental justice perspective as an analytical
framework. The article concludes that the
dam projects could improve their social
sustainability framework in practice and
theory; social benchmarking should be
introduced and social policies need to be
improved to be in line with international social
standards on hydropower projects.
Key words: social sustainability, hydro-
power, China, Ghana, Cambodia
1. Introduction
Hydropower dams are experiencing a new
renaissance in many parts of the world, par-
ticularly in low and middle income countries,
where most of the hydropower potential
remains at relatively low levels of exploitation.
These countries have weak formal social
policy to remedy some of the social implica-
tions of large infrastructure projects. Often
these countries are therefore dependent that
hydropower projects include social sustain-
ability to mitigate some of the worst social
implications. The social implications of hydro-
power dams often include resettlement of
affected individuals and communities, psycho-
logical stress, loss or declines of livelihood,
changes to lifestyles and traditions, impacts on
fishing and agricultural activities as well as
food security, impacts on access to and quality
of water and land, as well as a range of envi-
ronmental adverse effects (Urban et al. 2013).
Large dams have been controversially debated
for several decades due to their large-scale and
often irreversible social and environmental
impacts (World Commission on Dams (WCD)
2000).
The controversial nature of hydropower
projects forced the World Bank to introduce
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safeguard policies in the 1980s to protect local
populations from the consequences of dams.
Examples of safeguard policies are involved
with issues such as ‘environmental assess-
ment, natural habitats, pest management,
compensation for involuntary resettlement,
indigenous peoples, forests, safety of dams,
cultural property, projects in international
waterways and projects in disputed areas’
(Hall 2007, p. 170). Project such as the Sardar
Sarovar Dam Projects in India, the Chonoy
dam in Guatemala and the Itaparica hydro-
power scheme became pivotal to the changes
of the World Bank’s approach to hydropower
(Hall 2007).
At the forefront of the renaissance of hydro-
power today is not the World Bank but Chinese
developers, first and foremost the world’s
largest overseas dam builder Sinohydro.
Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned enterprise
(SOE), is leading the global hydropower sector
in terms of number and size of dams built,
investment sums, and global coverage. This is
only being rivalled to a similar extent by the
China Three Gorges Corporation. While China
has a long history of domestic dam building,
recent developments have led to rising
numbers of Chinese overseas hydropower
dams, particularly in low and middle income
countries in Asia and Africa (Bosshard 2009;
McDonald et al. 2009; International Rivers
2012). Power generation equipment is now
China’s second largest export earner after elec-
trical appliances (Bosshard 2009). Despite the
rise of Chinese overseas hydropower dam
projects, the development and application of
social standards for hydropower dam projects
have been slow.
Nordensvard et al. (2015) found that
Sinohydro’s attempts to improve their social
records have resulted in rather vague policy
recommendations and a lack of enforceable
social standards. In 2011 Sinohydro released
its policy commitments entitled ‘Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development’
(Sinohydro 2011; Decarboni.se 2014), which
was very closely linked to World Bank Stan-
dards. Eight policy commitments from overall
12 policy commitments were matching with
World Bank-related performance standards.
Later these documents by Sinohydro were
superseded with much weaker and vaguer poli-
cies like the Occupational Health, Safety and
Environmental Policy (Sinohydro 2013),
Statement of Ethical Principle (Sinohydro
2014a), and Sustainable Development Policy
(Sinohydro 2014b). These policy documents
focus far less on the social implications of the
local stakeholders. As China has become the
largest investor and builder of hydropower
dams, it is of importance to do more compara-
tive research on the practical implications of
corporate social responsibility of Chinese
hydropower dam projects.
This article aims to analyse social sustain-
ability in two case studies of Chinese hydro-
power dams in Ghana (Bui Dam) and Cambo-
dia (Kamchay Dam), which are both built by
Sinohydro. The case studies are based on
in-depths interviews and focus group discus-
sions with local communities, institutional
actors in Ghana and Cambodia, Chinese
actors, and dam builders. The article uses a
social sustainability/environmental justice lens
to look at both the substantive and procedural
dimension of the social impacts of hydropower
dams. The article concludes that the Sinohydro
dam projects could improve their social
sustainability framework in practice and
theory; social benchmarking should be intro-
duced and social policies need to be improved
to be in line with international social standards
on hydropower projects.
2. Theoretical Framework
The main research question of this article is:
how do Chinese hydropower projects built
by Sinohydro and financed by ExIm Bank
ensure social sustainability towards the local
affected population? This is being examined
by analysing the social sustainability of two
Chinese hydropower dams, one in Ghana (Bui
Dam) and one in Cambodia (Kamchay Dam).
This section discusses the theoretical frame-
work on which the article is based. Key
theories are social sustainability, sustainable
development and environmental justice.
Social sustainability has become an increas-
ingly important part of hydropower dam proj-
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ects as they are increasingly built in countries
that struggle to cope with the social implica-
tions of these large projects. Sustainability was
popularised by the Brundtland Report in 1987
and became synonymous with ‘development
that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs’’ (World Commission
on Environment and Development 1987, p.
43). There was an interest of integrating the
social, economic and environmental dimen-
sions of development. These dimensions were
seen as the core pillars of sustainable develop-
ment. The original Brundtland Report sig-
nalled an interest in social issues. It was
important to incorporate needs, and the report
stipulated that ‘the essential needs of the
world’s poor’ should be given an ‘overriding
priority’ (World Commission on Environment
and Development 1987, p. 43). The peak of
sustainability was in the 1990s, sparked by the
United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development in Rio de Janeiro. Twenty years
later, the Rio+20 summit put sustainable
development back onto the agenda. This will
be followed by the sustainable development
goals (SDGs), which will build upon the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and be in line
with the post-2015 international development
agenda. While environmental and economic
development will be at the forefront of many
of the goals, social goals are also firmly
embedded in the SDGs.
There has been an attempt to link social
sustainability to the concept of environmental
justice. This makes sense as environmental
justice has a more developed social justice
perspective compared with the original envi-
ronmental pillar in sustainable development.
This article suggests that such a discourse
helps strengthen social sustainability and
gives body to an analysis of hydropower dam
projects in low and middle income countries.
Environmental justice differs from other envi-
ronmental discourses by defining the environ-
ment as the set of linked places ‘where we
live, work and play’ (Turner & Wu 2002,
p. 4).
The environmental justice framework origi-
nated from a US context that focused around
issues of race and ethnicity and how these
were intertwined with the distributions of envi-
ronmental ‘bads’, such as pollution and tech-
nological risk (Bullard 1999). Environmental
justice became the concept for describing
political activism in the United States to ‘resist
the imposition of toxic and polluting facilities
in minority and poor communities’ (Walker
2009, p. 356). Distributive justice became a
focal point in framing how communities of
colour have been exposed to environmental
hazards, such as toxic waste or other environ-
mental issues. Categories such as gender, race
and class and impact of environmental ‘bads’
and access to environmental ‘goods’ such as
quality of life, natural resources and a clean
environment became the heart of discussing
distributive justice and the environment
(Boström 2012, p. 5).
The focus on distribution has often been
expanded upon with other dimensions, such as
participation, recognition and capabilities.
Pulido (1996), Faber (2005) and Schlosberg
(2007) have highlighted the importance of
process and production in environmental
justice. There is an overarching perception that
most pollution and degradation are caused by
the more affluent and powerful, and the envi-
ronmental consequences hit the poor dispro-
portionately. It is therefore important that the
decision-making process in environmental
policy and particular projects are transparent,
just and participative. The importance lies in
creating fair processes for environmental
policy-making and policy implementation.
There is a perception that if the policy-making
and implementation have been fair, participat-
ing parties tend to accept a disliked outcome
(Deutsch 2000). Procedural justice is less
about equal distribution and more about the
direct empowerment and participation of dif-
ferent stakeholders in environmental processes
(Boström 2012, p. 5).
Schlosberg discusses the links between
political participation and recognition, draw-
ing upon the discussion by both Young and
Fraser. The overall argument is that one needs
to acknowledge that a lack of respect and
recognition could lead to a ‘decline in a per-
son’s membership and participation in the
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greater community, including the political and
institutional order’ (Schlosberg 2004, p. 519).
Schlosberg also argues that we also need to
add a capability dimension to environmental
justice that ‘enrich conceptions of environ-
mental and climate justice by bringing recog-
nition to the functioning of these systems, in
addition to those who live within and depend
on them’ (Schlosberg 2013, p. 44). This
approach has created an attempt to include
environmental concerns into a movement that
has often been perceived to be anthropocentric
(Shrader-Frechette 2002). ‘When we interrupt,
corrupt, or defile the potential functioning of
ecological support systems, we do an injustice
not only to human beings, but also to all of
those non-humans that depend on the integrity
of the system for their own functioning’
(Schlosberg 2013, p. 44).
Over the decades, environmental justice
has expanded both in theory and in geo-
graphical application. The interplay between
global and local manifestations and agendas
has become more important (Walker &
Bulkeley 2006; Schlosberg 2007; Carruthers
2008; Schroeder et al. 2008; Sze & London
2008). Sze and London suggest that the envi-
ronmental justice framework is today used at
a global scale, incorporating both global and
local concerns on an interdisciplinary basis
(Sze & London 2008). Walker (2009) sees
this development as a horizontal diffusion of
environmental justice ideas, topical and geo-
graphic scope.
Agyeman and Evans (2004) argue that ‘just
sustainability’ needs a clear linkage between
sustainable development and environmental
justice to prevent that the social pillar becomes
one-sided. Harvey points out that environmen-
tal injustices need to be a first priority on the
sustainability agenda (Harvey 1996, p. 385).
The links between environmental justice and
social sustainability have become more impor-
tant to enrich the classical understanding of
impact assessments and conflicts in the light of
large infrastructural projects, such as hydro-
power dams. The importance of these concepts
in looking at social impacts tends to focus
on ‘distributive (fair allocation of resources)
and especially procedural justice (recogni-
tion, participation and power distribution)’
(Karjalainen & Järvikoski 2010).
2.1 Analytical Framework
In this study we focus on looking at distribu-
tive and procedural dimensions as a way to
understand how socially sustainable a hydro-
power dam project is (see Table 1). We work
with Boström’s (2012) conceptualisation
of social sustainability. His ‘what’ category
covers substantive aspects of social sustain-
ability, hence covering the distributive dimen-
sion. His ‘how’ category covers procedural
aspects of social sustainability. This article
examines how substantive the social sustain-
ability of Chinese overseas dams is. The
research thereby questions if the large dam
projects can sustain stakeholders’ basic needs,
support local stakeholders’ livelihoods and
also provide them with basic services. This
looks at the redistributive aspect of corporate
Table 1 Adapted Social Sustainability Framework
for Hydropower Dams, Derived and Amended from
Boström (2012)
Substantive social sustainability for hydropower dams
Basic needs such as sufficient food, adequate housing,
income and extended needs
Employment and opportunities for learning and
self-development
Provision of basic services such as clean water supply,
sanitation, reliable electricity supply,
schooling/education, health services,
mobility/transportation
Fair distribution of environmental ‘bads’ and
‘goods’/equality of rights, including human rights,
land user and tenure rights, and Indigenous people’s
rights
Procedural social sustainability for hydropower dams
Accountable governance and management of the policy,
planning, and standard-setting process and its
implementation; including holding actors accountable
for fulfilling their promises and pledges
Social monitoring of the policy, planning,
standard-setting process and its implementation
Access to participation and decision-making in different
stages of the process and over time/proactive
stakeholder communication and consultation
throughout the process
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citizenship. The second aspect that we look at
is the procedural aspect to analyse how
accountable the processes are, and whether
transparent information, communication and
participation is happening. In this article we
will look at the substantive and procedural
dimensions of Chinese hydropower dams in
Ghana and Cambodia (see the case study
selection criteria in Section 3 below). With
substantive dimensions, we have adapted
Boström’s (2012) categories for analysing
social impacts on the local population directly
affected by the dams. Substantive dimension
here means researching how the affected
people have been able to meet basic needs and
have access to basic service, and to analyse if
their burden is just and fair.
The first part of the empirical section there-
fore compares the substantive dimension of the
Bui Dam in Ghana and the Kamchay Dam in
Cambodia. The focus is on people who either
experienced losses/declines to their liveli-
hoods and/or had to relocate to new areas to
live. The overall research question is how
do Chinese hydropower projects built by
Sinohydro and financed by ExIm Bank ensure
social sustainability towards the local affected
population? The subquestion for this part is:
how do hydropower dam projects impact the
social welfare of the affected population, and
which policies have been in place to mitigate
possible substantive injustice towards the
affected population?
With procedural dimensions, we have
adapted Boström’s (2012) categories to under-
stand whether the projects have been empow-
ering or disempowering towards the local
affected population. This means explicitly to
research whether the hydropower dam projects
have been accountable in both governing and
managing the process of building a hydro-
power dam and involving the local population.
The second part of the empirical study will
look at the procedural aspect of the two
selected dams. The subquestion for this part is:
how have the developers and builders imple-
mented principles to make the governance
process transparent, accountable, accessible
and open to the participation of the local
affected population?
3. Case Studies
China has become the most dominant interna-
tional actor for international hydropower proj-
ects in recent years. While China has a long
history of domestic dam building, Chinese
dam builders are relatively new to the interna-
tional dam industry and have had a rapid
increase in activity in recent years. China is
today the world’s largest hydropower devel-
oper. Chinese dam builders differ from other
dam builders due to the role of SOEs that are
backed by abundant state funding; their own
distinctive way of handling (and not seldom,
disregarding) social and environmental
impacts; and their pragmatic approach to
regional politics and political alliances and
their need for access to natural resources
(Hensengerth 2013; Urban et al. 2013), as well
as their low costs that make them outcompete
OECD competitors. In addition, the Chinese
government incentivises the bundling of aid,
trade and investments, also for overseas hydro-
power dam projects (Urban et al. 2013).
Chinese dam builders tend to invest in coun-
tries and regions where the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank and other multilat-
eral organisations usually tend to shy away
from investing in hydropower developments,
such as in Myanmar, Borneo and Sudan. With
regard to Chinese overseas dam projects, there
are currently more than 300 Chinese overseas
dams of all sizes, most of them in Southeast
Asia (38 per cent) and Africa (27 per cent)
(Urban & Nordensvard 2014). Of these more
than 170 are large dams already completed or
currently under construction (International
Rivers 2014). The largest hydropower dam
building company in China is the SOE
Sinohydro Corporation, which is subject to the
rules and regulations of State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Committee
of the State Council (International Rivers
2008). Financial institutions like ExIm
Bank and Sinosure also have a significant
interest in hydropower development and are
involved in the majority of China’s overseas
investments (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2008).
An estimated 60 per cent of Sinosure’s
medium- and long-term loan activity is for
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China ExIm Bank transactions (McDonald
et al. 2009).
Depending on the national circumstances,
dam builders such as Sinohydro may in some
cases have influence on decisions regarding
where a dam should be built, as they can be
involved in initiating surveys and planning the
dam, and how it should be designed, engi-
neered and constructed, which often includes
major decisions about size of the dam, gener-
ating capacity, size of the reservoir that will
flood the area etc. However often dam builders
are asked by governments to build a dam at a
certain location under certain conditions,
hence limiting their decision-making power
and making them only the executers of a dam
project. In some cases, Sinohydro has acted as
the project developer for Build-Own-Transfer
projects. Developers are usually involved to
some extent in the environmental impact
assessment (EIA)/environmental and social
impact assessment (ESIA) so that the environ-
mental and social impacts of the dams are
evaluated and mitigation measures are devel-
oped (such as resettlements and compensation,
rescue missions for animals before the reser-
voir flooding, planting new trees after the
flooding etc.). Compared with project contrac-
tors and builders, developers are therefore well
aware of the full extent of the dam building
and its impacts, and can make informed deci-
sions about its sustainability and whether or
not a project should go ahead. However, many
of these decisions may also be taken by the
national government and then requested to
be implemented by a developer, such as
Sinohydro. Sinohydro is usually the builder of
dams, but in increasing number of projects
Sinohydro is also the project developer. In
some cases, such as for the Kamchay Dam in
Cambodia, Sinohydro was the builder, con-
tractor and developer.
We have chosen two dam projects that are
built by Sinohydro and financed by ExIm
Bank. This covers the largest builder and
financier of Chinese overseas hydropower
dams. These two dams have been chosen
because they each represent a specific
approach to Chinese dam building. We have
chosen one dam in Africa and one in Southeast
Asia, where most of the Chinese overseas
dams are located. Each dam involves the
Chinese as dam developers and focuses on
large dams of more than 50 MW (which tends
to be the main size Chinese dam builders are
investing in), where construction has recently
been completed and where access to the dam
sites, to local communities and national and
local governments is favourable, hence allow-
ing independent fieldwork.
Choosing two dams in two different coun-
tries enables us to assess whether there is a
common approach to social sustainability of
Chinese overseas hydropower dams such as
implicit social standards or effective measures
to remedy issues of substantive and procedural
dimensions.
The Bui Dam in Ghana has a power genera-
tion capacity of 400 MW and a net average
energy production of 980 gigawatt hours/year.
It costs an estimated US$621 million (Intern-
ational Rivers 2014). The dam started operation
in 2013 (Environmental Resources Manage-
ment (ERM) 2007). The financiers are China’s
Export Import (ExIm) Bank and the Ghana
Government, while the builder is Sinohydro
and the developer is Ghana’s government
(International Rivers 2014). The Bui Dam is the
second largest dam in Ghana. It is located in the
Northern/Brong-Ahafo Region on the Black
Volta River at the Bui Gorge. Parts of the dam
are located within the Bui National Park. The
dam includes a reservoir occupying 440 km2 of
the Bui Gorge, which flooded 21 per cent of the
total area of the Bui National Park.
The Kamchay Dam in Cambodia has a gen-
erating capacity of 193 MW and costs an esti-
mated US$280 million (International Rivers
2013), which was part of a bundled US$600
million aid and investment package from
China to Cambodia. This bundling of aid is
unusual for OECD financiers, but common for
Chinese financiers. The financiers are China’s
ExIm Bank, while the builders, developers and
contractors are Sinohydro. Sinohydro started
building the Kamchay Dam in Kampot Prov-
ince, Southern Cambodia in 2006. The dam
started operation in late 2011. The dam is
located in Bokor National Park (Middleton
2008; Grimsditch 2012).
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The project involves an interdisciplinary,
multi-sited, comparative case-study approach
that reflects the international scope of the
complex interconnections between Chinese
dam builders and low and middle income
countries.
3.1 Data Collection
We first conducted a multilevel stakeholder
mapping to identify key stakeholders engaged
in Chinese overseas hydropower projects for
each of the host countries. The outcome was
used to guide the date collection. The field-
work was conducted between 2012 and 2014
in Ghana and Cambodia. We first conducted a
pilot study, then the fieldwork with local com-
munities, followed by the fieldwork with local
and national government authorities. This took
about a year and a half for each dam, including
conducting the pilot study.
For the Bui and Kamchay dams, we carried
out in-depth interviews and focus groups with
affected communities, local stakeholders and
Chinese actors, for a total of 78 interviews and
20 focus group discussions (see Table 2 for
details).
In addition to primary data that we collected
throughout the fieldwork, we used supple-
mentary data from secondary sources. The
selection of the secondary data was based on
the following selection categories: (i) technical
data about the dam, (ii) social and environmen-
tal impact data, and (iii) guidelines, standards,
strategies and legal papers relating to the
dam builders. For example, we used quantita-
tive secondary data from International
River’s extensive database, which includes
comprehensive up-to-date data about each
of China’s hydropower projects worldwide
(for example, information about which
organisations are the dam’s contractor, devel-
oper, financier, costs of the dam, size, location,
environmental, and social implications). We
further used technical dam details from the
GEO database. We also compiled secondary
data to assess the environmental impacts of
dams and their governance implications by
examining the EIA reports of the dams. We
also analysed dam project documentation
and firm strategies, such as Sinohydro’s envi-
ronmental and social guidelines outlined in
their handbook. This secondary data include
information about Sinohydro’s approach to
social and environmental impacts, how they
align themselves with the standards of other
dam funders such as the World Bank, what they
care about, and what is only mentioned on the
margins (or not at all).
We coded the interview and focus group
consultation data and used the Nvivo 10 soft-
ware (QSR International, Melbourne, Austra-
lia) to analyse. These were analysed using
narrative analysis (Wiles et al. 2005), which
Table 2 Interview Set-Up
Targets Methods No. of interviews Further details
Affected communities
Bui Dam project: (Bator, Bui, Gyama and
Dokokyina)
Kamchay Dam project: (Bat Kbal Damrey,
Moat Peam, Ou Touch, Snam Prampir,
Tvi Khan Cheung)
Focus groups 10 for Bui, 10 for Kamchay:
20 in total (5–10 people
each; 150 people in total)
50% women;
50% men
Affected individuals Semi-structured 46 (Bui: 25, Kamchay 21)
Institutional actors Semi-structured
interviews
21 National/local
government, NGOs
Chinese actors Semi-structured
interviews
11 Sinohydro, regulators
and financiers
Total Semi-structured
interviews
78
Focus group
discussions
20
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allows us to compare several cases to be able to
draw parallels from similar findings and flag
up any differences (Yin 2009).
4. Results
4.1 Substantive Dimension
The main social impacts of the Bui Dam in
Ghana were the impacts on livelihoods, the loss
of land and the resettlement of the affected
people. The construction of the Bui Dam in
Ghana caused the inundation of six villages. As
a result, 1,216 people were relocated from their
old villages to new settlements. In addition,
7,500 people from four villages lost access to
farmland and forests (ERM 2007). Villages rely
on farmland for crops and grazing mainly for
subsistence. In the low season, fish is for sub-
sistence; in the high season, fish is also sold on
the market. Other livelihoods activities include
hunting and gathering, and trading. After the
construction of the dam livelihood, losses con-
cerning farming and fishing activities have been
reported by local residents.
Most of the resettled people interviewed
reported losses of yields due to poor fertility of
the soil of the new farming land provided to
them by the Ghanaian government in the
resettlement areas. Fishing activities have also
decreased due to difficulties to access the river,
which is far away from the new settlement
sites compared with previous settlements.
Moreover, even though fishing communities
have now access to the reservoir for fishing,
local people stated that they do not have the
necessary skills to fish in the lake. They also
reported that some people died during fishing
in the reservoir due to the lack of experience.
To be more specific, the interviewed fishermen
at the Bui Dam site reported that fishing in the
lake is more dangerous than fishing in the river
due to the presence of strong winds and the
formation of big waves and currents. The res-
ervoir is in fact less protected by vegetation
from winds than the river, partially due to the
clearance of the forest for the construction of
the dam. Fishermen do not have the required
skills and knowledge to fish in the lake under
these new conditions also because the old
boats fishermen were using to fish in the river
have problems of stability in the reservoir.
These new circumstances have caused several
incidents, and some cases of death were
reported.
It has also been reported by the interviewees
that a number of the fishermen had been
arrested because they are not allowed to fish in
parts of the river, which falls within a protected
game reserve in Bui National Park. Those who
were collecting forest products, such as
women collecting shea nuts for sale, are not
able to engage in these activities effectively
post-resettlement because of the distance to
the forest area. The reduced activities have a
negative impact on the livelihoods of the local
population and even affect food security. Most
of the affected people are subsistence farmers.
They do not know exactly how much of their
livelihoods decreased as they only farm for
their own use. They find it hard to quantify the
changes, but they report that the quality of the
new land is low and the soil is rather infertile,
which makes agriculture difficult and affects
their food security. Declines in livelihoods of
the resettled communities are therefore a
major negative impact of the dam.
Regarding land compensation, since
farming is not allowed in a national park in
Ghana, monetary compensation for the loss of
land due to inundation has been provided only
to chiefs and families who lose farming land
that was located outside of the Bui National
Park or to those with land titles or registration.
The interviewees reported that those who
farmed on land within the national park bound-
aries did not receive monetary compensation
for loss of land. Cash compensation for crops
has been paid according to the harvest or
market value for lost cash crops, based on the
average annual market value over crops for the
previous 3 years. This is, however, a problem
as monetary compensation of crops is only a
one-off payment, while the loss of the crops is
being felt year after year and means families
have instable food arrangements year after
year.
According to the Bui Dam Resettlement
Planning Framework (RPF), ‘land for land’
compensation must be provided based on the
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principle of equivalent land productivity and
the size of the land (ERM 2007). However,
communities’ members received very small
sizes of the land after resettlement, which are
less fertile. The land was measured by Ghana-
ian government agencies before the resettle-
ment. After the resettlement, the affected
people got a different plot of land as a com-
pensation for the land taken from them. The
government agencies said they measured the
new land, and it has the same size as the old
land, but the affected people reported during
the fieldwork that the land is smaller; however
they have not measured either land sizes. The
main issue at the Bui Dam resettlement sites is,
however, not the land size, but the fertility of
the soil, which is reported to be of much lower
fertility than the old land. Crops do, therefore,
not grow as well as they did before, affecting
food security and incomes for resettled fami-
lies. Households who lost farmland due to the
dam flooding were entitled to receive cash
payments for crops and trees, and they were
also eligible for livelihood and rehabilitation
programs in case they lost more than 20
per cent of their land. An example of this is
Livelihoods Enhancement Programme, which
provides a safety net for households directly
impacted by the project through assistant pro-
grams including microcredits, and training
programs (RPF 2007). While social protection
measures exist in theory, the resettled people
are still waiting for these measures to be
implemented, as no formal social protection
programs have been implemented yet.
Our interviews reveal that the following
measures were part of the compensation
program: new housing facilities in the new
settlement area; replacement compensation for
fixed assets, such as schools, clinics and com-
munity centres; and water and sanitation facili-
ties. After the construction of the dam,
resettled communities were provided with
electricity, sanitation and water facilities.
However, the interviews revealed that the
quality of some of the facilities provided has
been questioned by resettled people. Sanitary
facilities, such as toilets, are not used by the
majority of the households due to malfunction-
ing, as was reported by some of the villagers
interviewed in different resettled communities,
namely Battor, Bui, Jama and Dokokyina.
Field evidence, however, shows that overall
adequate housing facilities have been pro-
vided, and residents in the resettled areas
stated to be generally satisfied with the new
houses.
The construction of the Kamchay Dam in
Cambodia has a series of severe impacts on the
local population. There are approximately
22,000 people living in the rural area that is
directly affected by the dam in Kampot prov-
ince (NGO Forum Cambodia 2013). However,
different from the Bui Dam, no resettlements
have taken place to date. The reservoir has
been filled in an area that was not inhabited,
located in Bokor National Park, which was
used by the locals for income-generating
activities, mostly to collect bamboo for
making baskets and selling them on the local
market.
The bamboo collectors are the biggest group
that has been adversely affected by the dam.
They depend on bamboo collection for their
livelihoods as they collect bamboo to make
baskets. Most of the bamboo collectors do not
have any other sources of income, many of
them do not own any land nor have any assets,
and most of them have very low literacy rates
and can therefore not easily move on to more
skilled jobs. The dam has flooded the bamboo
forest area that the villagers used for bamboo
collection. The dam, therefore, meant a loss of
livelihoods for many bamboo collectors. While
the main bamboo collection area is flooded,
the villagers have found another smaller
bamboo forest site that is further away and
now belongs to the land owned by Sinohydro.
Our interviews reveal that occasionally
Sinohydro puts a ban on bamboo collection
and closes off access to the area completely,
sometimes up to 2 weeks at a time. This means
that the villagers do not have any income for 2
weeks and have instead started borrowing
money from microcredit institutions. With no
other income sources, the local people are
however not able to repay the loans. Our field-
work revealed that many of the villagers are
therefore experiencing extreme financial hard-
ship, are experiencing adverse impacts on food
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security, and are considering options such as
moving to Phnom Penh or even Thailand as
migrant workers to secure their livelihoods.
The second group of people who are
affected by the dam are the fuel wood collec-
tors. They face a similar situation to the
bamboo collectors, although access to parts of
the forest areas is currently banned by the
Cambodian government for fuel wood collec-
tors due to forest conservation efforts, and
there is a ban on trucks and engine boats on the
reservoir.
The third group of people who are nega-
tively affected by the dam are the fruit sellers
at Teuk Chhu riverside resort who are depen-
dent on income from tourism. As the river is
often dry since the dam construction, the
tourist numbers have declined by about 80
per cent in 2013 as the affected locals’ report,
which is being confirmed by other reports
(NGO Forum Cambodia 2013). The sellers
who depend on tourism also mentioned that
their incomes have declined by about 80
per cent compared with before the dam,
making it very difficult to provide an income
for their families. Unlike in the Bui Dam case,
there are no schemes for training/livelihood/
other employment options for the people
adversely affected by the Kamchay Dam.
The fourth group of people who are
impacted by the dam are the durian growers
and other plantation owners. Some of them
received compensation by Sinohydro for land
that was lost due to the construction of the
dam. Rather than compensating for the land,
Sinohydro compensated the affected families
for the lost trees. The villagers reported that a
lost banana tree was compensated at US$10, a
mango tree at US$30, a durian tree at $100–
500 depending on size and age. Compensation
was paid to villagers who lost their rice fields,
however only at US$3 per square metre, which
the villagers considered too low. Rice was only
planted for subsistence by the local population,
not for commercial purposes. As rice paddies
have been lost, the affected families now need
to purchase rice rather than grow their own.
This has had adverse effects on food security.
Several families live under the power lines
that were constructed for electricity transmis-
sion from the dam to urban areas. Our
interviewees report that these people were sup-
posed to be resettled; however, this has not
happed yet, and it is not clear yet how and
when they will be compensated and relocated.
No other resettlement took place; hence,
housing and relocation are not an issue.
Regarding fishing, only a few people fish
near the Kamchay Dam, most of them prefer
fishing in the nearby sea. Two major ecological
changes are occurring due to the dam blocking
the natural flow of the water. First, as the
Kamchay Dam is located close to the sea, it
blocks the Kamchay river’s freshwater flow
upstream, which means that downstream the
river’s water is much saltier than before the
dam construction. This has a negative impact
on fish and other aquatic species as freshwater
species cannot inhabit this salty, altered river-
ine ecosystem. Second, every year in the
monsoon season, Cambodia experiences the
reversal of the water flow from the sea inland
due to heavy rains. This is exemplified at Tonlé
Sap lake, which expands and shrinks signifi-
cantly with the seasons as the water flow
changes directions. This phenomenon is far
less pronounced at the Kamchay river,
although the local population told us during
the fieldwork that the water flow does reverse
to some extent. This is now not happening as
the dam is blocking the river. Hence, fish and
other aquatic organisms cannot migrate up the
river in the rainy season. For these two
reasons, the abundance and diversity of fish
and other aquatic organisms has decreased;
hence, river fishing has become less desirable
than before for the local population.
Ironically, many of the people living next to
the Kamchay hydroelectric dam do not have
access to electricity. The fieldwork reveals that
only about a third of villages around the
Kamchay Dam have access to electricity from
the dam, and out of these villages only about
15–20 per cent of households have access to
electricity. Nevertheless, for those who have
access to electricity, the price of electricity has
been reduced from 1,800 Riel per kWh to 920
Riel per kWh. This is, however, higher than
the initially mentioned 500–600 Riel per kWh
that was promised by Sinohydro, as our
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interviewees report. Even though electricity
has become more affordable, many people do
not have the financial means to connect to the
grid as it requires a connection fee of US$160
per household, as the villagers report.
4.2 Procedural Dimension
Most of the procedural aspect of the Bui Dam
project has focused on creating accountable
governance and management. This includes
the management and implementation of the
ESIA of the dam, the RPF, and the mitigation
plan that details measures for reducing the
environmental and social implications of
the dam. According to government officials,
the ESIA was commissioned before the con-
struction of the dam by the Ministry of Energy
of the Ghanaian government and carried out by
the UK firm Environmental Resources Man-
agement (ERM). The contract with Sinohydro
was a turnkey contract or EPC contract (engi-
neering, procurement, construction).
According to the environmental regulations
in Ghana, before a development project
receives an approved environmental permit,
the ESIA has to be issued and presented to the
Environment Protection Agency. Only when
the environmental permit is obtained the loan
agreement with the project funder, in this case
China ExIm Bank, can be signed (Hensengerth
2011). Environmental regulations and stan-
dards in Ghana are relatively strong, and they
reflect international standards, particularly
those developed by the World Bank, and stan-
dards of the International Organisation for
Standardisation (Hensengerth 2011).
The Chinese are neither directly involved in
the ESIA nor the resettlement of the local
population. Instead, a new local authority was
created by the Ghanaian government for the
management of the dam and its impacts,
including the implementation of the resettle-
ment plan, namely the Bui Power Authority
(BPA 2007). The BPA was established by an
Act of Parliament, BPA Act 740, in 2007 by
the Ghanaian Government for the planning,
execution and management of the Bui Dam
project. The main functions of the BPA include
the generation of electrical power, the opera-
tion of the dam, the construction of the trans-
mission lines and system, the supply of the
electrical power generated at the dam, the pro-
vision of facilities and assistance for the use of
the lake created by the construction of the dam,
as well as the development of activities at the
dam area.
The interviewees mentioned that the social
monitoring has been delegated to the project
owner BPA, and since above permits are
granted to BPA it also has the responsibility to
monitor Sinohydro’s adherence to permits’
conditions. Obligations of the contractor (in
this case Sinohydro) is the implementation of a
construction management plan, including
dealing with the workforce and local residents,
ensuring health and safety, and ‘good house-
keeping’ (ERM 2007, p. 1). Finally, Sinohydro
was involved in some of the monitoring activi-
ties together with several governmental agen-
cies. Local people affected by the dam, such as
those who were later resettled, were invited to
attend consultation meetings. However, not all
relevant issues were discussed at the consulta-
tion meetings. Some of the affected people
regretted in the interviews the fact that they
were not consulted regarding decisions about
the resettlement site, which is less diverse in
terms of vegetation and lower in soil quality
than the location of the previous villages. Nev-
ertheless, the respondents indicated that most
of them took part in consultation meetings that
addressed the impacts of the dam, the upcom-
ing need for resettlement and compensation
measures. However, the lack of a consultation
process to identify challenges and post-project
construction issues and claims has been
reported by interviewees and in other recent
studies (Doh & Andoh 2014). The actors who
conducted the consultation meetings were Gha-
naians, not Chinese stakeholders, as the
interviewees report.
The governance and management process in
the Kamchay Dam project have been markedly
different from the Bui Dam. The Kamchay
Dam contract between Sinohydro and the
Cambodian government is a build, operate,
transfer contract (BOT). Sinohydro will trans-
fer the ownership of the dam to the Cambodian
government after 44 years, in 2050.
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The government authorities that are respon-
sible for dams in Cambodia are the Ministry of
Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), the Min-
istry of Water Resources and Meteorology
(MOWRAM) and the Ministry of Environ-
ment (MoE). MIME is the government author-
ity that makes the main decisions for dam
building in Cambodia and the authority that
deals directly with the dam builders.
All BOT projects, such as the Kamchay
Dam, have to be approved by the Council for
the Development of Cambodia. There is a Law
on Water Resource Management, and all
hydropower projects require a water use
licence from MOWRAM (Grimsditch 2012).
The main legal framework for the EIA is the
sub-decree on EIA passed by MoE in 1999.
The EIA has to be approved by several minis-
tries, including those mentioned above.
According to the interviewees, the MoE is pri-
marily responsible for organising the conduc-
tion of the EIA, reviewing the report and
monitoring compliance with environmental
legislation. Accountability is generally weak
for failings related to the dam. There have been
serious shortcomings with regard to the Envi-
ronmental and Social Impacts Assessment
(ESIA). By Cambodian law, development
projects such as dams are required to have an
EIA in place and approved before the construc-
tion process begins. Cambodian law also pre-
scribed that the EIA process should be
transparent, the decision-making should be
accountable, and a wide consultation process
should involve affected local communities and
civil society organisations (Middleton 2008;
NGO Forum Cambodia 2013). However, at the
Kamchay Dam, the EIA process was seriously
flawed. The EIA process started late, and the
EIA approval was in fact granted 7 months
after the inauguration of the dam, as inter-
viewees point out. Overall, the implementation
of environmental and social safeguards is
minimal and not in line with Cambodian leg-
islation, as the interviews revealed. In addition,
the Environmental Management Plan (MEP),
which aims to implement mitigation measures
to reduce the negative effects of the dam, was
not in place until the late stages of the dam
construction. It is also being reported by gov-
ernment officials, locals and civil society that
Sinohydro has not implemented any mitigation
measures. Sinohydro is said to have set aside a
so-far untouched budget of US$5 million for
implementing mitigating measures; however,
even government officials are criticising
Sinohydro for its inaction.
The consultation processes before the dam
construction were patchy and ad hoc with little
local participation as our fieldwork finds and
other reports confirm (International Rivers
2013). Many villagers were not invited to con-
sultation processes and became only aware of
the dam once construction had started. There
are also a range of unresolved complaints from
the local population, for example due to the
closure of the bamboo forest area. The local
villagers have complained against Sinohydro
in various forms (petitions, mass demonstra-
tions, filing individual complaints). Neverthe-
less, they had to follow a strict hierarchy
addressing first the village chief, then the
commune authority, then the district authority,
then the provincial authority, and from there
on the complaints are said to be taken to the
appropriate ministries in Phnom Penh
(mainly MIME), who then establishes a com-
munication with Sinohydro. This is despite
Sinohydro’s offices being based at the dam
site, in very close proximity to the affected
villages.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our research findings suggest that both the Bui
and Kamchay dams have disparate social
implications for the local population.
However, the mechanisms that are designed to
handle these social implications are very dif-
ferent in Ghana and Cambodia. This implies
that one cannot generalise that Chinese dam
building is standardised or normalised. The
research concludes that Chinese builder
Sinohydro and financier ExIm Bank can
follow social standards for planning and
implementing hydropower dams, if requested
to do so by the national government. If
however the national government does not
request social standards, dam builders can cir-
cumvent them.
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The comparison highlights that there is no
standard procedure for handling the social
implications of Sinohydro’s dam projects. The
Bui Dam is an Engineering, Procurement,
Construction (EPC) contract, which is a
turnkey contract in which the Chinese dam
builders Sinohydro are the contractors who
build the dam and then transfer the ownership
and daily management of the dam to Ghana’s
government. This makes Ghana’s government
in charge of the resettlement process, of com-
pensating the affected local people, of imple-
menting mitigating measures to reduce the
adverse environmental and social impacts of
the dam, and of managing the dam and its
impacts on a daily basis. In 2007, the BPA was
established to plan, implement and manage the
dam. Once the dam had been built, the owner-
ship of the dam was transferred from
Sinohydro to the Ghanaian government, with
the BPA being the main dam authority. Some
social safeguard programs are in place, at least
in theory, although their actual implementation
remains weak.
The Kamchay Dam on the other hand is a
Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) contract,
which means that the Cambodian government
grants a concession to Sinohydro for recover-
ing its investment by allowing the dam builder
to own and operate the dam for 44 years and to
sell electricity to the grid. After the 44 years
of ownership by Sinohydro, the dam owner-
ship will be transferred to the Cambodian gov-
ernment, albeit after the peaking of the
economic lifetime of the dam. Technically, this
makes the dam builder Sinohydro in charge of
either finding a contractor or dealing with criti-
cal issues themselves, such as the resettle-
ment process (which was not needed at the
Kamchay Dam), of compensating the affected
local people, of implementing mitigating mea-
sures to reduce the adverse environmental and
social impacts of the dam, and of managing the
dam and its impacts on a daily basis. In reality
however, Sinohydro operates and manages the
dam, but leaves dealing with the social and
environmental impacts of the dam largely
to the local authorities. MIME is the main
Cambodian authority responsible for dam
building and for dealing with Sinohydro. MoE
and the provincial Department for the Environ-
ment have less decision power over the
dam and are expecting Sinohydro to fully take
up its contractual responsibilities, such as
paying the outstanding payments for mitigat-
ing measures. While a BOT contract techni-
cally makes the contractor, builder and
operator (in this case Sinohydro) in charge of
the dam and its social and environmental
impacts, some of these cumbersome tasks
seem to be left to the Cambodian authorities
to deal with at the Kamchay Dam, such as
in relation to the complaints from affected
communities.
The case studies highlight that the dam proj-
ects could improve their social sustainability
framework in practice and theory, and that
social policies need to be improved for Chinese
overseas dams to be in line with international
social standards on hydropower projects. The
research finds reluctance by the dam builders
and its financiers to implement important
aspects of substantive justice, such as setting a
minimum standard for social protection of the
local communities. This may be seen in contrast
to international attempts to create guidelines
and social performance standards. The WCD
attempted in 2000 to develop a framework
entitled Dams and Development: A New
Framework for Decision-Making that could
facilitate the planning, implementation and
operation of dams. The International Hydro-
power Association (IHA) launched their own
sustainability guidelines in 2004, which was
followed by their Hydropower Sustain-
ability Assessment Protocol in 2006, which has
also been translated into Chinese. There has
also been a rise in assessment techniques,
such as social impact assessment, multi-
stakeholders platforms and transboundary
environmental impact assessments (Mirumachi
& Torriti 2012) The International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) has, as a part of the World Bank
Group, created Environmental and Social Per-
formance Standards and Guidance Notes for
investment that have been regularly updated
and have become a norm for large overseas
investment. For example, IFC’s sustainability
framework includes performance standards
that apply to all investment and advisory clients
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whose projects go through IFC’s initial credit
review (IFC 2012).
Interestingly, Sinohydro was about to imple-
ment a minimum standard in their Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development in
2011, which outlined a catalogue of commit-
ments for social sustainability. The resettle-
ment commitments were, for example,
influenced by World Bank-related documents,
such as the IFC performance standard docu-
ments, and also contained legal compliance
and environmental assessment policies driven
by Sinohydro’s own policy documents. The
policy also mentioned no dams should be built
in national parks. This policy was, however,
superseded by weaker and vaguer policy docu-
ments in 2013 and 2014. At the moment,
Chinese dam builders do not seem to shy away
from investing in environmentally protected
areas, such as national parks, as is the case both
in Ghana (Bui National Park) and Cambodia
(Bokor National Park). Hensengerth (2013)
indicates that no investors and dam builders
from the OECD dared to finance and build the
Bui Dam due to its major environmental and
social impacts. Attempts from OECD compa-
nies such as Halliburton fell short, and in the
end the Ghanaian government opted for
Chinese funders and dam builders, namely
ExIm Bank and Sinohydro. There is a lack of
political will to implement minimal standards
to prevent cases of procedural and substantive
environmental injustice. This might highlight
that corporative self-regulation has met its
greatest challenge in Chinese corporations,
such as Sinohydro and ExIm Bank. Some aca-
demics argue further that a new approach to the
regulation of corporate social responsibility is
needed (Altman & Vidaver-Cohen 2000;
Waddock & Smith 2000).
The main research question of this article
was to evaluate how Chinese hydropower proj-
ects built by Sinohydro and financed by ExIm
Bank ensure social sustainability towards the
local affected population. This was done by
analysing the social sustainability of two
Chinese hydropower dams in Ghana (Bui
Dam) and Cambodia (Kamchay Dam),
drawing on 78 interviews, 20 focus group dis-
cussions and document analysis. The research
concluded that social sustainability varies
from dam to dam as Chinese dam builders lack
an overall standardised code of conduct
regarding social impacts. This also means the
degree to which the social rights of the affected
communities are ensured is rather variable.
The individual hydropower project is depen-
dent on the local conditions of governance, as
well as on the type of contract. There seems to
be a reluctance to implement a minimum
social standard for hydropower dams built and
financed by Sinohydro and ExIm Bank. Our
research analysed the impacts on the social
welfare of the affected population and how
these impacts had been mitigated, as well
as how the dam builders implemented an
accountable and participatory governance
process. The impacts with regard to liveli-
hoods and social welfare were severe in both
dam cases. Most strikingly, we found differ-
ences between the governance process in
Ghana, which was more accountable and par-
ticipatory, versus Cambodia, which was less
accountable and participatory.
To conclude, we suggest that there needs to
be a global benchmark system that ranks
hydropower firms and investors according to
their social and environmental performance. In
addition, a global code of conduct for social
and environmental sustainability for interna-
tional hydropower projects should be followed
by all hydropower firms and investors. A wide
range of different regulatory bodies and guide-
lines already exist for large infrastructure
investments and dam building; however, none
of these are standardised across the hydro-
power industry. The most well-regarded and
widely accepted guideline today is the IHA’s
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Proto-
col, which we suggest should be implemented
by Chinese dam builders too. In addition, a
global benchmarking system could review
large dam builders and their social impact per-
formance on a regular basis. This would evalu-
ate and rank the social performance of
Chinese, OECD, Brazilian, Thai and any other
dam builder. This may require the active role
of the civil society, which has already in the
past flagged up many grievances and which
actively monitors the dam industry and its
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impacts. These recommendations are not only
valid for Chinese dam builders, but for other
dam builders from any other country or
organisation.
With regard to further research needs, this is
a relatively new field for social policy research,
which links into wider research on social
policy and the environment. This research field
relates to social policy that centres around big
infrastructure projects and their social and
environmental impacts. It thereby links into a
wide range of social policy issues such as
human well-being and welfare, social protec-
tion, the rights of marginalised people, food
security, livelihoods, social and environmental
justice, state-building etc. It is a yet under-
researched but increasingly important and
topical research that deserves more attention in
academic literature.
July 2015.
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